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Abstract
Constructive modal logics come in several diﬀerent ﬂavours and constructive description logics, not surpris-
ingly, do the same. We introduce an intuitionistic description logic, which we call iALC (for intuitionistic
ALC, since ALC is the name of the canonical description logic system) and provide axioms, a Natural
Deduction formulation and a sequent calculus for it. The system iALC is related to Simpson’s constructive
modal logic IK the same way Mendler and Scheele’s cALC is related to constructive CK and in the same
way classical multimodal K is related to ALC. In the system iALC, as well as in cALC, the classical prin-
ciples of the excluded middle C unionsq ¬C = T, double negation ¬¬C = C and the deﬁnitions of the modalities
∃R.C = ¬∀R.¬C and ∀R.C = ¬∃R.¬C are no longer validities, but simply non-trivial TBox statements
used to axiomatize speciﬁc application scenarios. Meanwhile in iALC, like in classical ALC, we have that
the distribution of existential roles over disjunction i.e. ∃R.(C unionsqD) = ∃R.C unionsq ∃R.D and (the nullary case)
∃R.⊥ = ⊥ hold, which is not true for cALC. We intend to use iALC for modelling juridical Artiﬁcial
Intelligence (AI) systems and we describe brieﬂy how.
1 Introduction
Description Logics are an important knowledge representation formalism, unifying
and giving a logical basis to the well known AI frame-based systems of the eighties.
Description logics are very popular right now. Given the existent and proposed
applications of the Semantic Web, there has been a fair amount of work into ﬁnding
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the most well-behaved system of description logic that has the broadest application,
for any speciﬁc domain. As discussed in [7], considering versions of constructive de-
scription logics makes sense, both from a theoretical and from a practical viewpoint.
There are several possible and sensible ways of deﬁning constructive description log-
ics, whether your motivation is natural language semantics (as in [7]) or Legal AI
(as in [9]).
Description logics tend to come in families of logical systems, depending on
which concept constructors you allow in the logic. Since description logics came
into existence as fragments of ﬁrst-order logic chosen to ﬁnd the best trade-oﬀ pos-
sible between expressiveness and tractability of the fragment, several systems were
discussed and in the taxonomy of systems that emerged the one called ALC (for
Attributive Language with Complements) has come to be known as the canonical
one. The basic building blocks of description logics are concepts, roles and individ-
uals. Think of concepts as unary predicates in usual ﬁrst-order logic and of roles as
binary predicates, used to modify the concepts.
As far as constructive description logics are concerned, Mendler and Scheele
have worked out a very compelling system cALC [12], based on the constructive
modal logic CK [2]), a favorite 4 system of ours. However in this note we follow a
diﬀerent path and describe a constructive version of ALC, based on the framework
for constructive modal logics developed by Simpson (the system IK) in his phd
thesis [17]. We call our system iALC for Intuitionistic ALC. (For a proof-theoretic
comparison between the constructive modal logics CK and IK one can see [14]).
Our motivation, besides Simpson’s work, is the framework developed by Brau¨ner
and de Paiva in [5] for constructive Hybrid Logics. We reason that having already
frameworks for constructive modal and constructive hybrid logics in the labelled
style of Simpson, we might end up with the best style of constructive description
logics, in terms of both solid foundations and ease of implementation. Since sub-
mitting this paper we have been told about the master thesis of Cle´ment [6] which
follows broadly similar lines. Cle´ment proves soundness and completeness of the
system called IALC and then provides a focused version of this system, a very in-
teresting development, as focused systems are, apparently, very useful for proof
search.
We ﬁrst recall Simpson’s framework for constructive modal logics and Brau¨ner
and de Paiva’s system for constructive hybrid logics. Then we introduce our version
of intuitionistic description logic, denoted iALC. We brieﬂy describe the immediate
properties of this system and most importantly we discuss a case study of the use
of iALC in legal AI and conclude with some interesting directions of further work.
2 Constructive modal and hybrid logics
Traditionally modal logics are classical propositional logics augmented with modal-
ities for necessity, possibility, obligations, provability etc. While by no means the
most popular ones, there are several reasonable systems of constructive modal logics
4 This system has categorical semantics, which are not very easy to obtain for modal logics.
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in the literature too. Surprisingly, very little is known about the inter-relationships
between several of these systems. Many of these systems take the semantics of
propositional modal logics in terms of Kripke frames as their fundamental intuition
and modify it to account for an intuitionistic basis, instead of the classical one. In
this paper we are mostly concerned with the framework proposed by Simpson [17].
This consists of a series of Natural Deduction systems, which arise from interpret-
ing the usual possible worlds deﬁnitions in an intuitionistic meta-theory. The main
beneﬁt of these Natural Deduction systems over axiomatizations is their suscep-
tibility to proof-theoretic techniques. Strong normalization and confuence results
are proved for all of the systems described. On the downside the basic structure
of Natural Deduction needs to be extended to deal with assumptions of the form
world x is R-related to world y, which is written as a second kind of formula xRy.
Building up from Simpson’s framework for constructive modal logics, in [5],
Brau¨ner and de Paiva introduced intuitionistic hybrid logics, denoted by IHL. Hybrid
logics add to usual modal logics a new kind of propositional symbols, the nominals,
and also the so-called satisfaction operators. A nominal is assumed to be true at
exactly one world, so a nominal can be considered the name of a world. If x is a
nominal andX is an arbitrary formula, then a new formula x : X called a satisfaction
statement can be formed. The part x : of x : X is called a satisfaction operator. The
satisfaction statement x : X expresses that the formula X is true at one particular
world, namely the world at which the nominal x is true. Constructing a system
of intuitionistic hybrid logic, based on Simpson’s Natural Deduction is relatively
straightforward. The hard work is to prove that the whole machinery of nominals
and satisfaction operators is orthogonal enough to the intuitionistic characteristics
of the basis and that we can still have the expected proof-theoretical properties of
the hybrid system, as desired. In hindsight one can see that Simpson’s formulation
of modal logic (called here IML, for intuitionistic modal logic) shares with hybrid
formalisms the idea of making the possible-world semantics part of the deductive
system. While IML makes the relationship between worlds (e.g., xRy) part of the
deductive system, IHL goes one step further and sees the worlds themselves x, y
as part of the deductive system, (as they are now nominals) and the satisfaction
relation itself as part of the deductive system, as it is now a syntactic operator, with
modality-like properties.
Out of these tightly connected systems of intuitionistic modal logic IML and
intuitionistic hybrid logics IHL, we want to carve out our system of intuitionistic
description logic iALC. However, for some of our applications, we prefer to work
with a sequent calculus, as opposed to a Natural Deduction system. For this reason,
we make use of Negri’s well-developed proof theory for modal systems [13].
3 Towards the system iALC
Like classical ALC [1] the intuitionistic version iALC is a basic description language
whose concept constructors are described by the following grammar:
C,D ::= A | ⊥ |  | ¬C | C D | C unionsqD | C  D | ∃R.C | ∀R.C
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where A stands for an atomic concept and R for an atomic role, given an initial
set of role names and of atomic concepts names. This syntax is more general than
standard ALC in that it includes subsumption  as a concept-forming operator. In
a constructive setting subsumption behaves somewhat like strict implication. (We
will have no use for nested subsumptions, but they do make the system easier to
deﬁne, so we keep the general rules.) Negation can be represented via subsumption,
as ¬C can be deﬁned as C  ⊥, but we ﬁnd it convenient to keep it in the language.
The constant  can also be omitted since it can be represented by ¬⊥.
Following Mendler and Scheele we say a constructive interpretation of iALC is
a structure I = (ΔI ,	I , ·I) consisting of a non-empty set ΔI of entities in which
each entity represents a partially deﬁned individual; a reﬁnement pre-ordering 	I
on ΔI , i.e., a reﬂexive and transitive relation; and an interpretation function ·I
mapping each role name R to a binary relation RI ⊆ ΔI × ΔI and each atomic
concept A to a set AI ⊆ ΔI which is closed under reﬁnement, i.e., x ∈ AI and
x 	I y implies y ∈ AI . The interpretation I is lifted from atomic ⊥, A to arbitrary
concepts via:
I =df ΔI
(¬C)I =df {x|∀y ∈ ΔI .x 	 y ⇒ y ∈ CI}
(C D)I =df CI ∩DI
(C unionsqD)I =df CI ∪DI
(C  D)I =df {x|∀y ∈ ΔI .(x 	 y and y ∈ CI) ⇒ y ∈ DI}
(∃R.C)I =df {x|∀y ∈ ΔI .x 	 y ⇒ ∃z ∈ ΔI .(y, z) ∈ RI and z ∈ CI}
(∀R.C)I =df {x|∀y ∈ ΔI .x 	 y ⇒ ∀z ∈ ΔI .(y, z) ∈ RI ⇒ z ∈ CI}
Our setting is a simpliﬁcation of Mendler and Scheele’s where we dispense with
infallible entities, since our system iALC satisﬁes ∃R.⊥ = ⊥, just like classical ALC.
Semantic validity can be introduced as follows: say “x satisﬁes C in the inter-
pretation I”, written as I, x |= C, if x is in the interpretation of C, x ∈ CI . Say
I |= C if this happens for all x in ΔI . Finally say |= C if for all interpretations I
we have I |= C. These deﬁnitions are usually extended to sets of concepts.
Typical reasoning in description logics is done via TBoxes and ABoxes. If we
use Γ for a TBox, i.e. a collection of concepts and subsumptions and Θ for an
ABox, a collection of instantiations of concepts then we can say Θ,Γ |= C if for all
interpretations I, which are models of all the concepts in Γ it is the case that every
x in I which satisfy the axioms in Θ must also satisfy C, or
∀I.∀x ∈ ΔI .(I |= Θ and I, x |= Γ) implies I, x |= C
A Hilbert-style axiomatization of iALC is easy to provide. It consists of all
axioms of intuitionistic propositional logic plus the axioms and rules displayed in
Figure 1.
Proving soundness and completeness of the Hilbert version of iALC above, as it
is done by Mendler and Scheele [12, p. 7] poses no problems. Repeating their work
we can say: Let the symbol H denote a Hilbert deduction, that is Γ H C if there
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all axioms of propositional intuitionistic logic (IPL)
∀R.(C  D)  (∀R.C  ∀R.D) (∀K)
∃R.(C  D)  (∃R.C  ∃R.D) (∃K)
∃R.(C unionsqD)  (∃R.C unionsq ∃R.D) (DIST)
∃R.⊥  ⊥ (DIST0)
(∃R.C  ∀R.C)  ∀R.(C  D) (DISTmix)
If C is a theorem then ∀R.C is a theorem too. (DISTmix)
If C and C  D are theorems, D is a theorem too. (MP)
Fig. 1. The System iALC: Hilbert-style
exists a derivation C0, C1, C2, . . . , Cn where the last concept Cn = C and each Ci is
either a hypothesis (Ci is in Γ) or is a substitution instance from one of the axioms
above or obtained via the rules MP and Nec from earlier concepts Cj , j ≤ i. The
Hilbert calculus implements TBox reasoning and we have, just doing cut-and-paste
from [12]:
Theorem 3.1 The Hilbert calculus described in Figure 1 is sound and complete for
TBox reasoning, that is Γ, ∅ |= C if and only if Γ H C.
4 A sequent calculus for iALC
Working to give a Gentzen sequent-style presentation for iALC we move ﬁrst to a
labelled system in the style of Simpson’s framework. Simpson’s original system is
a Natural Deduction system, where the rules for modalities are meant to capture
exactly the intuitions of possible worlds. Restricting Simpson’s IK to the description
logic fragment gives the rules in Figure 2, where we elided the rules for unionsq and ,
which are well-known.
A sequent calculus version of Simpson’s rules is discussed by Negri [13] (in the
classical case) and we prefer to use the sequent calculus. We have to adapt Negri’s
sequent calculus to the description logic fragment and to make it intuionistic, which
seems easy enough. The rules are in the Figure 3 below. Note that our version,
which is constructive, has restrictions to a single conclusion formula in the rules for
subsumption and universal-quantiﬁcation-role on the right, which are essential to
keep the system intuitionistic, in the propositional setting.
There are two main modiﬁcations from usual, non-labelled sequent calculus for
modal logic. First, of course we need to add the labels, which intuitively describe
the world where the concept is being asserted. Thus x : C means that the concept
C is asserted to exist in the world x. Secondly we have the relational kind of
premises in the deductive system, assertions of the form xRy, which mean that the
role R relates worlds x and y. Both of these additions would seem sensible in the
description logic setting: it is reassuring to see the same rules for roles in Straccia’s
4-valued Description Logic [18].
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Γ ⇒  Γ ⇒ x : ⊥Γ ⇒ y : C
Γ ⇒ x : C  D Γ ⇒ x : C -e
Γ ⇒ x : D
Γ, x : C ⇒ x : D -i
Γ ⇒ x : C  D
Γ ⇒ ∀R.C Γ ⇒ xRy ∀-e
Γ ⇒ y : C
Γ, xRy ⇒ y : C ∀-i
Γ ⇒ x : ∀R.C
Γ ⇒ x : ∃R.C Γ, y : C, xRy ⇒ z : D ∃-e
Γ ⇒ z : D
Γ ⇒ y : C Γ ⇒ xRy ∃-i
Γ ⇒ x : ∃R.C
Fig. 2. Natural Deduction iALC Rules
The rules for the propositional connectives (,unionsq) are basically the same as for
classical ALC, we just have to add worlds everyehere, but these do not change with
the application of rules. (Similarly the rules for subsumption  are just the rules
for intuitionistic implication with worlds added). The main modiﬁcation comes for
the modal (or role quantiﬁcation) rules, which now follow exactly the intuitions of
Kripke relational semantics. Since the intuitive semantics of box (necessity) says
x |= C iﬀ for all y, xRy implies y |= C
and we are reading ∀R.C as C (following Schild [16]) we derive a rule that says if
y : C can be derived for an arbitrary y that is R-related to x then x : ∀R.C holds,
or
Γ, xRy ⇒ y : C ∀-r
Γ ⇒ x : ∀R.C
The fact that y must be arbitrary is reﬂected in the usual condition that y is not
(free) in Γ. Reading the semantics again, the converse gives us the left rule for the
universal role,
Γ, x : ∀R.C, y : C, xRy ⇒ Δ ∀-l
Γ, x : ∀R.C, xRy ⇒ Δ
as if x : ∀R.C and y is accessible from x then y : C, where we need to repeat the
formula x : ∀R.C to make the rule invertible. Similar reasoning, from the intended
semantics, get us the rules for existential quantiﬁcation. We say
x |= C iﬀ there exists y, xRy and y |= C
The left to right direction gives us
Γ, xRy, y : C ⇒ Δ ∃-l
Γ, x : ∃R.C ⇒ Δ
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while the right to left direction gives the binary rule
Γ ⇒ Δ, xRy Γ ⇒ Δ, y : C
Γ ⇒ Δ, x : ∃R.C
which is turned into the equivalent unary rule
Γ, xRy ⇒ Δ, y : C, x : ∃R.C ∃-r
Γ, xRy ⇒ Δ, x : ∃R.C
where the concept x : ∃R.C is repeated in the antecedent, just for invertibility rea-
sons. As traditional in ﬁrst-order logic, the rules ∀-r and ∃-l have the side condition
that y is not in the conclusion.
xRy,Γ ⇒ Δ, xRy Γ, x : C ⇒ x : C,Δ
Γ ⇒  Γ, x : ⊥ ⇒ Δ
Γ ⇒ x : C Γ, x : D ⇒ Δ -l
Γ, x : C  D ⇒ Δ
Γ, x : C ⇒ x : D -r
Γ ⇒ x : C  D
Γ, x : C, x : D ⇒ Δ -l
Γ, x : (C D) ⇒ Δ
Γ ⇒ x : C,Δ Γ ⇒ x : D,Δ -r
Γ ⇒ x : (C D),Δ
Γ, x : C ⇒ Δ Γ, x : D ⇒ Δ unionsq-l
Γ, x : (C unionsqD) ⇒ Δ
Γ ⇒ x : C, x : D,Δ unionsq-r
Γ ⇒ x : (C unionsqD),Δ
Γ, x : ∀R.C, y : C, xRy ⇒ Δ ∀-l
Γ, x : ∀R.C, xRy ⇒ Δ
Γ, xRy ⇒ y : C ∀-r
Γ ⇒ x : ∀R.C
Γ, xRy, y : C ⇒ Δ ∃-l
Γ, x : ∃R.C ⇒ Δ
Γ ⇒ Δ, y : C, x : ∃R.C ∃-r
Γ ⇒ Δ, x : ∃R.C
Fig. 3. iALC Sequent Rules
The system iALC described here is related to Simpson’s IK the same way Mendler
and Scheele’s cALC [12] is related to constructive CK [2] and [11] and in the same
way classical multimodal K is related to ALC[16]. In the system iALC we deﬁned, as
well as in cALC, the classical principles of the excluded middle C unionsq¬C = T, double
negation ¬¬C = C and the deﬁnitions of the modalities ∃R.C = ¬∀R.¬C and
∀R.C = ¬∃R.¬C are no longer validities, but non-trivial TBox statements used to
axiomatize speciﬁc application scenarios. Meanwhile in iALC, like in classical ALC,
we have that the distribution of existential roles over disjunction i.e. ∃R.(C unionsqD) =
∃R.C unionsq ∃R.D and in the nullary case ∃R.⊥ = ⊥ hold, which is not true for cALC.
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5 Properties of iALC
Soundness and completeness of a sequent calculus version of iALC are easy to prove.
This is similar to the proof indicated in [12, page 10], although the sequent calculus
we proposed in Figure 3 is diﬀerent from theirs. Our sequents are simpler, as we do
not insist in carrying negative information along derivations. Our modal rules are
diﬀerent enough. Nonetheless we have:
Theorem 5.1 The sequent calculus for iALC in Figure 3 and the Hilbert calculus
described in Figure 1 are equivalent. For any TBox Θ and concept C, we have that
Θ, ∅ H C if and only if the sequent Θ ⇒ C has a derivation using the rules in
Figure 3.
The proof of soundness and completeness of the sequent calculus for iALC does
not come straight from Straccia’s work, as our rules for roles are the same, but our
semantics are diﬀerent. (He insists on 4-valuedness, we want constructiveness.)
Theorem 5.2 The sequent calculus described in Figure 3 is sound and complete
for TBox reasoning, that is Θ, ∅ |= C if and only if Θ S C.
We still have to contend with the criticism levelled by Bozzato et al in [4] that
a constructive description logic ought to satisfy the ﬁnite model property, which
is not clear from our (original) formulation. Bozzato et al have a formulation of
constructive hybrid logic based on closing the logic down under Kuroda’s axiom,
by construction. Other researchers (including Mendler and Scheele) have proved
the ﬁnite model property and decidability for (variants) of the description logics we
consider. In particular Simpson has proved the ﬁnite model property for IK [17,
page 157] but for his birelational models. We leave as future work to do the same
for iALC.
6 Applying iALC
Mendler and Scheele cite auditing of business as their motivational application. We
envisage applying our system to legal AI, as one of us (Hausler) is tasked with
developing prototypes for legal AI systems. We have presented a simpliﬁed case
study of this application in [9] and [8]. We repeat its rationale here, in a simpliﬁed
form.
One of the main problems from legal theory is to make precise the use of the
term “law”. In fact, the problem of individuation, namely, the problem of deciding
what counts as the unit of law, seems to be one of the fundamental open questions
in jurisprudence. That is, any discussion of law classiﬁcation must be preceded by
an answer to the question “What is to count as one complete law?” ([15]). There
are two main approaches to this question. One is to take as the law all (exist-
ing) legally valid statments as a single, whole entity. This totality is called “the
law”. This approach is predominant in legal philosophy and jurisprudence owing
its signiﬁcance to the Legal Positivism tradition initiated by Hans Kelsen (for a
contemporary reference see [10]). The coherence of “the law” plays a central role
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in this approach, whilst a debate on whether coherence is built-in by the restric-
tions induced by Nature in an evolutionary way, or whether it should be object of
knowledge management, seems to be a long and classical debate. The other ap-
proach to law deﬁnition is to take into account all legally valid statements as being
individual laws. This view, in essence, is harder to be shared with jurisprudence
principles, since those principles are ﬁrstly concerned with justifying the law. This
latter approach seems to be more suitable to Legal AI. It is also considered by legal
theoreticians, at least partially, whenever they start considering ontological com-
mitments, such as, taking some legal relations as primitive ones (Hohfeld, 1919),
primary and secondary rule (Hart, 1961) or even a two-level logic to deal with dif-
ferent aspects of law (see logic-of-imperation/logic-of-obligation from [3]). In fact,
many Knowledge Engineering (KE) groups pursue the deﬁnition of legal ontologies
on this basis. We also follow this route. It is important to note that the pure use
of a deontic logic has been shown to be inadequate to accomplish this task. In [19]
it is shown that deontic logic does not properly distinguish the normative status of
a situation from the normative status of a norm (rule).
From the semantic point of view, iALC seems to be adequate to model the legal
theoretic approach pursued by KE as described above. Let us consider an iALC
model having as individuals each of the possible legal statements. The 	 relation
is the natural hierarchy existing between individual legal statements. For example,
sometimes conﬂicts between legal statements are solved by inspecting the age of
the laws, the diﬀerence between enforcement scope of each law, etc. Any of these
relations can be considered transitive and reﬂexive. If C is a concept symbol in the
description logic language, its semantics is a subset of legal statements representing
a kind of legal situation. Roles in the description logic language are associated to
relations between these legal situations, imposed by the relationship between each
pair of individual legal stls -l atements.
The main reason to use an intuitionistic logic in legal reasoning is to have the
ability to express partiality and incomplete information, beyond the standard open
world assumption. Because the semantic meaning of our concepts should be context
dependent, we need a constructive version of undeﬁnedness that allows for intrinsic
reﬁnement of concepts. Classical description logic assumes that each concept is
static and that at the outset either it includes a given entity or not. This corresponds
to a binary truth interpretation. If we trade this static setting for a constructive
notion of truth we believe this will provide us with a well-understood and more
sophisticated way of dealing with reﬁnement of concepts. Of course it remains to
be seen if we can keep the other features that made description logics as useful as
they have proved themselves, so far.
7 Conclusions
We presented rules leading up to a new system of constructive description logic
called iALC. This system is the natural restriction of Simpson’s framework for
constructive modal logic to the description logic setting and ﬁts in naturally with
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Brauner and de Paiva’s intuitionistic hybrid logic IHL. The results we prove about
the system are not very surprising. What is unsettling is the number of design
choices left to us and the diﬃculty in obtaining hard criteria for choosing between
the multiple systems available. We have not much to report on this, yet.
Besides further investigating the relationship between systems based on IK and
systems based on CK, especially their semantics counterparts, we would like to
implement a framework that would allow us to construct proofs in the three systems
iALC, IK and IHL. The main application we envisage for our system at the moment
is in knowledge engineering of juridical systems, as one of us (Hauesler) leads a
project on this topic. This project is just beginning and time will tell if the initial
intuitions concerning simplicity of modeling coupled with ease of implementation
will bear fruit or not.
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